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Saplings or Caterpillars? Trying to Understand Children’s Wellbeing 
PATRICK TOMLIN 
Forthcoming in Journal of Applied Philosophy 
 
ABSTRACT Is childhood valuable? And is childhood as, less, or more, valuable than 
adulthood? In this essay I first delineate several different questions that we might be 
asking when we think about the ‘value of childhood’, and I explore some difficulties of 
doing so. I then focus on the question of whether childhood is good for the person who 
experiences it. I argue for two key claims. First, if childhood wellbeing is measured by the 
same standards as adulthood, then children are worse off than adults. Second, if 
childhood and adulthood wellbeing are measured by different standards, then we cannot 
compare them, and children are neither better off nor worse off than adults. This has 
some counter-intuitive implications, such as we do not harm persons by depriving them 
of a childhood, nor by keeping them as children for elongated periods. 
 
I 
What makes children’s lives go well? And are their lives as good, better, or worse than 
the lives of the adults they will become? These are the questions I seek to address in 
this essay. But I will spend quite a bit of the essay reflecting on these questions 
indirectly. That is because I want to first lay out several different questions we might 
ask in trying to make comparative assessments of the value or goodness of children’s 
and adults’ lives, before focusing in on one in particular. It is also because I will spend 
some time reflecting on why it is difficult to make progress on these issues. Ordinarily, 
it is not worth flagging up that moral and political philosophy is a discipline in which 
it is hard to make progress – as philosophers our daily lives are struggles with that fact. 
But in this case I think it is worth highlighting because I think that there are some 
particular difficulties in this area that may be hidden from view. 
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There is an oversimplification in this paper which I should note at the outset. In this 
paper I talk of ‘children’ and ‘adults’. This oversimplifies for three reasons. First, the 
average five year old is very different from the average six month old. In other words, 
there are important variations within a childhood (and, indeed, adulthood). Second, it 
is not clear where exactly ‘childhood’ ends and ‘adulthood’ begins. For now, for ‘child’ 
imagine a young child – under four, say. For ‘adult’, imagine someone who is over 
thirty. The bits in between can wait. Third, all this talk of ‘the average’ masks huge 
variances in the capabilities and wellbeing of both children and adults. There is 
perhaps no sensible answer to many of the comparisons we might want to make 
between ‘childhood’ and ‘adulthood’, generically conceived – it depends on the 
individuals in question. But there are specific features of childhood and adulthood, 
and I will try to focus on those. Imagine reasonably good childhoods and adulthoods. 
We’ll start our comparisons from there. 
 
II 
Some recent work on the philosophy of childhood encourages us to think about ‘the 
value of childhood’, and in particular whether childhood is intrinsically good, or 
whether it is valuable merely insofar as it leads to adulthood. But I think that this 
‘simple’ question can fairly quickly deteriorate into several distinct questions as soon 
as we start to ask ‘good for who?’ and ‘good in what way?’ 
I will outline here six different groups of questions we might ask about the 
comparative value of childhood and adulthood. To start, consider this question: 
1. Is being a child good for the child, or would the child be better off being an 
adult? We can call this the question of internal value. 
But alongside this question about how well a life is going ‘from the inside’ so to speak, 
we can also ask a series of questions about the value, importance, or status of a life 
from the outside. Such as: 
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2. i. Are children as inherently valuable as adults? ii. Do they have the same kind 
of moral status? 
Even if a child’s life is going badly, its life may make the world go better than if it were 
an adult, or it may be more worthy of respect than an adult. We can call these 
questions of external value. 
Here’s one way to see the difference between question 1 and those outlined at 2. 
Imagine two adults: Jimmy and Jen. Jimmy’s life is going well, but Jen’s is not. Jimmy is 
happy, wealthy and healthy.1 Jen is none of these things. Jimmy’s life is going better 
from the inside, he has more individual wellbeing. But that need not necessarily affect 
our judgment that Jimmy and Jen’s lives are of equal value, or that they retain equal 
moral standing. 
The distinction between questions 1 and 2, and between internal and external value is, 
I think, really important when we try to compare the lives of adults and children. That 
is because when people present children as ‘imperfect adults’ who need to be helped 
to overcome the experience of being a child, the kinds of things they point toward 
children lacking – rationality, capacity for moral responsibility, and so on – are things 
that are often thought to contribute toward making adults’ lives important or valuable 
or of a certain kind of status, and not (necessarily) the sorts of thing that we often 
think are what make adults’ lives go well (such as happiness, health, and so on). It may 
be that children’s lives are better than those of adults from the inside, but adults have 
more (intrinsic) external value or importance.2 It may also be that, because of that 
fact, we have duties to turn children into adults. 
I worry that the nascent debate on the value of childhood is insufficiently attentive to 
the potential distinctiveness of these two questions. For example, Samantha Brennan 
criticizes Tamir Schapiro’s view of children as being in a ‘predicament’. Brennan 
appears to interpret this as being a thesis about how well children’s lives are going, 
and criticizes the claim that children’s lives are to be understood purely as ‘unfinished 
adults’. But we need to keep the two questions separate in our minds here. Adults 
might be more valuable or have a different standing than children (external value), 
without their lives necessarily going better (internal value). Indeed, I read Schapiro’s 
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claim as being about what we are owed qua adults and children, especially in terms of 
respect and control over our own lives – not a claim about how well or badly children’s 
lives are going.3 Indeed, Shapiro notes that the (parallel) Kantian argument from state 
of nature to political society does not rely on the claim that political society is 
intrinsically better. Similarly, I don’t think she (necessarily) thinks childhood is 
intrinsically inferior to adulthood from the inside, simply that there is an internal 
pressure from childhood to ascend to adulthood (which is a higher moral status).4 
That said, our answers to questions of internal value and external value need not be 
fully distinct. One way to collapse the distinction is to claim that part of what it is for 
your life to go well is to be a certain kind of moral being with a certain kind of moral 
status.5 Then we might say: these are the things that make an adult life go well, but it 
is also better for you (in and of itself) to be an adult. Another way would be to claim 
that what makes your life go well is also what gives you external value. For example, 
some utilitarians think that happiness makes lives go well, and also that lives with 
more happiness in them are more (externally) valuable – they make the world go 
better. 
Here is a third way that we might contrast the value of the lives of children and the 
lives of adults: 
3. Are children instrumentally valuable for other people? Do they have the same, 
more, or less, instrumental value as adults? Call this the question of external 
instrumental value. 
Again, when thinking about children, I think it is very important to consider this kind 
of value. Children, qua children, make the lives of (at least many) adults better. And 
they make the lives of other children better, and children having better lives leads to 
still more adults having better lives. 
This is important because when we ask, as I will later, whether we’d be better off 
skipping our childhoods, this isn’t the end of the ‘value of childhood’ question. I might 
consistently believe that I’d be better off having never been a child, and instead living 
my whole life as an adult (keeping length constant), but that I’d be worse off if there 
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were no children. I might therefore judge ‘a life in which I was a child and there are 
other children’ better than ‘a life in which I wasn’t a child and there are no children’, 
even if I think childhood a regrettable state for the individual who experiences it. 
A further question concerns internal instrumental value. This concerns the way in 
which childhood and adulthood may affect one another. Consider an adult who arrives 
into the world as an adult, and one who becomes an adult through the normal route of 
childhood. We might think the second adult’s life qua adult is enhanced by her 
previous experience of childhood – it might be better to be an adult who was a child 
than an adult who was not. More controversially, it may be better qua child to be a 
child who is going to be an adult than one who is not. 
4. Is adulthood better for having been a child? And is childhood better when 
followed (or presumed to be followed) by adulthood? Call this the question of 
internal instrumental value. 
Another question concerns the propriety of the kinds of comparisons we are 
considering – especially those of internal value (i.e., question 1). We might decide that 
we cannot compare children’s and adults’ lives. (This would be a sort of an answer to 
question 1, and one to which I will return). But alternatively we might think that while 
we can compare these lives, there is a sense in which we should not. For example, Jeff 
McMahan thinks it obvious that a chimpanzee’s life is going worse than ours. 
However, he also denies that the chimp suffers any misfortune.6 This is not because 
the chimp is not worse off than us (he is), but because he isn’t an appropriate kind of 
being to compare with us. The chimp is not in the same comparison class. ‘Misfortune’ 
is a quasi-technical term that McMahan reserves for those who are worse off compared 
with those to whom they are properly compared. This raises the question of whether 
children and adults are properly considered to be part of the same comparison class. 
5. Even if they can be compared, should the lives of children and adults be 
compared, such that one or the other can be thought to suffer a comparative 
misfortune? Call this the comparison class question. 
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Finally, and relatedly, there are different purposes for which we can compare how well 
individual lives are going, and these may demand different answers. To see this, 
consider the ‘resourcist’ answer to the ‘equality of what?’ question.7 Resourcists seek to 
compare how well people’s lives are going in terms of their (internal and external) 
resources. But this does not mean that they think a good life is (simply) one that is full 
of resources – resource holdings are not proposed as an answer to question 1. Rather, 
resources are generally useful in pursuing our own conception of the good, and so are 
considered to be the metric or currency of justice. In other words, resourcists are 
seeking to answer the question of how well a life is going for the purposes of justice, 
and they are not seeking to answer the question of how well a life is actually going. 
This gives us our final question, to be held to be distinct from question 1: 
6. How do we measure how well lives (including, perhaps, children’s lives) are 
going for the purposes of justice? Call this the metric of justice question. 
 
In my view, it is important to keep the distinctness of these six questions (or at least 
the possibility of their distinctness) in mind when thinking about the value or 
goodness of childhood. I think we will be able to provide a more careful and nuanced 
account of childhood’s goodness (or comparative lack thereof) by keeping these 
distinct questions (and the conceptual distinctions which they feed off) in mind. Since 
debates about the goods of childhood are gathering increasing attention (as this 
special issue attests), we will do well, collectively, to be precise about which 
question(s) we are seeking to answer. 
 
III 
In the remainder of this paper, I want to focus on the first question – the question of 
internal value. Before I proceed to offer some reflections on that question, I would first 
like to say something about why reflecting on, and answering, it is a lot more difficult 
than we might be tempted to think. 
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If I were to ask you what it is like to be a fly, or a horse, I’d wager you’d say you had 
little or no idea. But I think many of us think we have a pretty good idea of what it is 
like to be a child. After all, we used to be children. I think this fact – that we used to be 
children – is both a useful resource and a potential pitfall in thinking about childhood, 
and the values of childhood. In order to know what is good for children, I think we 
need a sense of what kinds of things children are, and what their lives are like, and can 
be like, from the inside. It’s tempting to think we already know this, for not only have 
we been round kids, we used to be kids, and we have memories of being children. 
There is a general problem of trying to imagine what it is like to be other kinds of 
being. This is exposed in Thomas Nagel’s famous essay ‘What is it like to be a Bat?’: 
Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose 
range is therefore limited. It will not help to try to imagine that one has 
webbing on one's arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn 
catching insects in one's mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives 
the surrounding world by a system of reflected high-frequency sound signals; 
and that one spends he day hanging upside down by one's feet in an attic. In so 
far as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be 
like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to 
know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am 
restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate 
to the task. I cannot perform it either by imagining additions to my present 
experience, or by imagining segments gradually subtracted from it, or by 
imagining some combination of additions, subtractions, and modifications.8 
Nagel’s point is that I can put myself in other people’s shoes – we are similar enough 
that I can imagine what it would be like to me, but in their circumstances. But I can’t 
imagine what it is like to be a bat – I could imagine being a person with bat-like 
qualities, but the fundamental batness of a bat would remain mysterious to me. 
I think something similar is true of trying to imagine what it is like to be a child, 
especially a very young child. However, this is not quite for the reasons that Nagel 
gives here. That is because I have experiences and memories of being a child, so it isn’t 
my lack of experience that restricts epistemic access. However, when I, here and now, 
try to access those experiences and memories, or to consider them, I immediately 
employ cognitive resources and concepts that are completely alien to children. For 
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example, I have a strong memory of being frightened by my father shaving off his 
beard when I was four. Yet when I try to consider how I felt, what it was like to be that 
frightened little boy, I immediately begin to think like an adult. I will use concepts and 
nuances and language that were unavailable to that four year old boy. Perhaps I am 
unusual here, but I genuinely believe that I don’t know what it was like to be a small 
child, even though I have memories of childhood. And when I try to think about it in 
order to try to find out, I find myself confirming that suspicion, because the very act of 
thinking involves using faculties that small children do not have. There is a danger 
that the fact that we were children leads us to be overconfident about our abilities to 
see childhood from the inside. This is not to say that children are as mysterious to us 
as bats – but they may be more like bats than we tend to think. 
A further complication in trying to figure out what childhood is like, and what kinds of 
value it might have, stems from the fact that childhood is a combination of two things: 
being a certain kind of being, intellectually and physically; and being comparatively 
new to the world.9 When we think of what childhood is like, or when we try to think 
of what may or may not be valuable about childhood, is it possible or desirable to 
separate these two things? For example, a seemingly useful way to think about 
whether childhood is good for us is to imagine (as I will in the next section) two lives 
of equal length, but with one lived entirely as an adult, and the other a normal life, 
lived as child and adult. But when we imagine this childhood-less life, are we to 
imagine that the permanent adult is plonked on earth as an adult (in terms of physical 
and intellectual capacity) but as new to the world, like Mork from Mork & Mindy? This 
comparison would test whether being a child (physically and intellectually) is of value, 
but much of what the new-to-the-world adult would experience would be like what 
childhood is like. She would still need to find out about herself, her likes and dislikes, 
to come to understand what is in the world, and her place in it. Childhood is in part 
exciting because of discovery, but discovery is about being new to the world, not about 
physically and intellectually being a child. Relatedly, from a negative perspective, 
small children spend quite a lot of time being ill. This is because their immune 
systems haven’t yet come across many viruses, and so each new virus will make them 
ill. But this, again, is to do with being new to the world, not being a child. It is hard to 
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know whether we should view being new to the world as something that happens to 
children, and something that we should seek to strip out of, or control for in, our 
thinking about being a child, or whether it is internal to what being a child is. It is also 
hard to know whether we can separate the two, even if we want to. 
Finally, we should bear in mind that not only are we used to people being children 
before they are adults, many of us are deeply emotionally invested in the idea that our 
children are having good lives. We love our children as children, and we love being 
parents to children, and so the thought that it might be better for them to skip 
childhood seems deeply inhumane and sad. We want to believe both that we can have 
children (and keep them as children for a decent length of time) and that this is in 
their best interests – that they are having good lives right now. As ever, we should be 
wary of (though not averse to) arriving at the moral conclusions we happen to want. 
 
IV 
In order to begin to focus on our comparative question about the internal value of 
childhood and adulthood, I want to briefly present two cases that (for me at least) 
generate conflicting intuitions: 
Left as a Child: Erin is given pills to prevent her from becoming an adult. 
Aged 55, she continues to be a child, both physically and mentally. She is 
well cared for. 
 
Deprived of Childhood: Dane is given pills to speed up his development. 
Aged 6, he is physically and mentally a fully-grown man.10 
If, like me, you think Erin has been harmed, this would seem to suggest that childhood 
is inferior to adulthood – our judgment is that Erin would be better off being an adult. 
This is the sort of view put forward by Loren Lomasky, who claims that ‘were one 
condemned…to remain a child throughout one’s existence…it would be a personal 
misfortune of the utmost gravity.’11 
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Erin’s case and Lomasky’s view seem to point toward what has been called the 
Aristotelian view of childhood.12 Under this view, children are ‘defective adults’, and it 
is our job as parents (and perhaps more widely as adult members of society) to turn 
them into adults. Childhood is a (comparatively) regrettable but ordinarily necessary 
stage on the way to personhood. I’m going to call this the Sapling View. Saplings are 
just smaller, weedier versions of trees.13 They are (I will stipulate) in some sense 
inferior to trees, but they will become trees. Note that Lomasky argues that it is a 
personal tragedy – i.e., it is a tragedy for Erin that she remains a child. That is, he sees 
this as a question of internal value. 
However, if, like me, you think Dane has also been harmed, then this would seem to 
suggest that a life with a full childhood is preferable to a life of equal length of 
adulthood only. Many of us feel that children ‘grow up too fast’ and try to keep a time 
in our children’s lives when they can just ‘be children’.14 This may be taken to suggest 
that childhood is better than adulthood. If Dane is harmed by being made an adult, 
this suggests that he would be better off being left a child. I will call this the Fruit 
View. Fruit gets worse with age. According to this view, so do human beings – we rot 
as we age. 
There is another view, which can account for both of these intuitions. We can call it 
the Diversity View. Under the Diversity View, a life in which we are both children and 
adults is better than one in which we are just one or the other. Plus, it is better when 
we are children and adults for certain time periods – and the period for which we 
usually think people should be children is (in my own experience) roughly the period 
for which we are children (i.e., five years is too short, twenty five years too long). 
Whilst I find this view attractive, I am suspicious of it. That is because it seems to 
trade on our implicit bias toward the normal.15 It would be fantastically fortuitous if 
nature had selected the very best outcome for us. There are all sorts of ways that 
nature fails us – disease, pain, and so on – so why think She has smiled on us especially 
kindly here? 
Our fondness for the normal can also help explain our intuitions in the Erin and Dane 
cases. Erin and Dane would both be deeply abnormal if we chose to give them their 
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respective pills. In addition, this abnormality would make their lives worse in ways 
that have nothing to do with childhood or adulthood per se: Dane would have a hard 
time associating with and connecting with people who had had full childhoods, whilst 
Erin’s friends would forever be leaving her behind, as they grew up and moved on. But 
what if the decision were about a whole generation? – we could make a whole 
generation grow up faster, or retard the development of a whole generation. When we 
consider things from this perspective, my sympathy for Dane decreases somewhat. I 
think it would be a crying shame if children were only children for a very short time, 
but I wonder if it would be a crying shame for parents more than anything else. 
My sympathy for Dane slides further when I try to overcome the potential ‘status quo’ 
bias, by applying Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord’s ‘Reversal Test’: 
 
The Reversal Test: When a proposal to change a certain parameter is thought to 
have bad overall consequences, consider a change to the same parameter in the 
opposite direction. If this is also thought to have bad overall consequences, 
then the onus is on those who reach these conclusions to explain why our 
position cannot be improved through changes to this parameter. If they are 
unable to do so, then we have reason to suspect that they suffer from status quo 
bias.16 
In this case, we can imagine that humans ordinarily live their whole lives as adults. 
Would we have reason to give them a period where they become like children? For 
example, imagine, at the ends of such lives, we could give people a pill which ensured 
that they had a period of ten years or more where their mental and physical capacities 
deteriorated into those of children.17 Would we give people that pill? It seems 
doubtful, to say the least. We spend billions of pounds trying to combat ‘illnesses’ in 
which something like this happens. Why imagine that inferior intellectual and 
physical ability is a personal tragedy at the end of a life, but a boon at its beginning? 
 
V 
So far we have tried to consider the comparative internal value of childhood and 
adulthood. We (or at least I) seem to have conflicting intuitions. In order to try to 
make progress, we need to consider what the goods of being a child are. Believing 
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there to be goods of being a child does not imply any particular answer to the 
comparative question. Even if we conclude that childhood has less internal value than 
adulthood, unless we conclude that children (qua children) have lives not worth 
living, their lives must have some internal value (and even if children’s lives are not 
worth living, their lives may contain some – outweighed – internal value). 
At this point, it will be useful to distinguish between some different (general) 
positions we might take on the goods of childhood and the goods of adulthood, and 
the relationships between them. In her ‘The Goods of Childhood’, Samantha Brennan 
states that the first question of such an enquiry is whether there are ‘childhood 
specific’ goods. On this question, we can outline three broad positions: 
A. There are no distinctive childhood goods – what is good for adults is good for 
children. 
 
B. What makes childhood and adult lives go well differs.18 There are four possible 
sub-views here: 
i. Childhood goods are a sub-set of adult goods 
ii. Adult goods are a sub-set of childhood goods 
iii. Adult and childhood goods overlap 
iv. Childhood and adult goods are completely different 
 
C. There are distinctive childhood goods, in that there are certain goods that only 
children are able to access, or children are better at accessing. These things 
would be good for adults, but adults are in general poor at accessing them.19 
Brennan’s case for ‘the goods of childhood’ is neutral across all three of these 
positions. Childhood specific goods, for Brennan, seems to mean just ‘goods enjoyed in 
childhood’ – goods which mean that children have lives that are good, and are not just 
valuable as potential adults.20 Brennan does, however, note the distinction between A 
on the one hand, and B and C on the other, and she speculates that ‘There is a certain 
kind of play that seems unique to childhood and which it’s hard to make up later in 
life if missed out on.’ But this claim is ambiguous between B and C. Play might be a 
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good ‘unique to childhood’ in that it is something that only children can access, but 
which would be good for adults if they were able to play in that way, or it might only 
be good for children. 
In addition to these positions, there is a variant on A. That is a position in which the 
ultimate goods for children and adults are the same, but the intermediate goods which 
will help them access those ultimate goods are different. For example, both children 
and adults’ ultimate good may be happiness. But they may need different things to be 
happy – adults need freedom, whilst children need to be controlled. Following G.A. 
Cohen, we may call this level of intermediate goods ‘midfare’21: 
D. There are no distinctive ultimate childhood goods – what is ultimately good for 
adults is ultimately good for children. But children and adults have different 
midfare goods. 
In this list of possible positions, A, C and D all accept that what makes adults’ lives go 
well is (ultimately) also what makes children’s lives go well. Only B envisages the 
possibility that there ought to be a fundamental distinction between our accounts of 
childhood and adult wellbeing. 
 
VI 
If A, C, or D of the above positions is adopted, then children’s lives should ultimately 
be judged by the same standards as adult lives. Some recent work has tried to get us to 
see that children’s lives as not merely bad adult lives – for example, there may be 
goods that are good for adults but that children are especially adept at accessing. This 
may well be true. Nevertheless, we must be careful not to romanticize childhood. In 
order to compare children’s lives and adult’s lives we need to not only consider in 
what ways children’s lives go well, but in what ways they go badly. Once we think of 
those, I find it very difficult to believe that children’s lives are not going badly in 
comparison with adults’ lives if, as we are imagining here, what makes children’s lives 
and adults’ lives go well are the same. If children’s lives are to be judged by adult 
standards, then Dane is made better off by being given his pill. In other words, if we 
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judge children’s and adults’ lives by the same standards, children are Saplings. That is 
because the following conditions characterise children’s lives. 
1. Children are utterly dominated. If we concede that being dominated is bad for 
people, then children’s lives are going badly in one important respect: children are 
extensively dominated. I think it is a (very weighty) personal good to be free from 
domination. The happy and playful slave has a bad life. I therefore think that if we are 
to judge children’s lives by the same standards as those by which we judge adults’, the 
distinctive goods of childhood are unlikely to outweigh the badness of being 
dominated. 
It may be argued that I’ve missed the point here. Non-domination is only good for 
those capable of using their freedom in certain ways, or who need it in certain ways. 
That is what I think, too, but then I think we’re saying that children and adults are 
different kinds of beings and we need to evaluate their lives differently. That is 
response B (from the A-D list above), which I consider in the next section. 
Something else that might be said is that interference is only domination, and 
therefore only bad for us, when it is arbitrary, and the interference children experience 
is non-arbitrary.22 There are two things to say to this. First, it does not follow from the 
fact that interference is only justified when it is not non-arbitrary that it is good, or not 
bad, for us when it is non-arbitrary. It may be good for us all things considered, but it 
might still be bad for us qua interference. Children need to be interfered with and 
controlled in order to access all kinds of goods. For example, children have little say in 
what and when they eat, and this is because we know that certain foods are good for 
them, and that they need to eat. It is in their interests, all-things-considered, to be 
controlled in this way. But I can get the same benefits and remain free from control. 
Isn’t that better? Wouldn’t my life be going worse if I needed to be interfered with in 
order to receive these goods? 
Second, it is not obvious that the interference children experience is non-arbitrary. It 
may be in their interests, but that is not sufficient to make interference non-arbitrary. 
For Philip Pettit, in order for power to be non-arbitrary, it must be forced to track the 
perceived interests of those on whom it is imposed.23 Are the powers we have over our 
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children limited in this way? They are subject to legal restraint, which is in turn under 
democratic control. But children are not represented in that process. If the UK were to 
run France, and track the interests of the French, and subject its policy to democratic 
control (in the UK Parliament), we would still think the French were dominated. If 
children can be dominated, I think they are. If domination is bad for adults, and if 
children’s lives are to be judged by the same standards, then I think this is a way in 
which children’s lives are going badly.24 
2. Children spend a lot of time being unhappy. Happiness may not be the only good, as 
utilitarians believe, but it is surely part of what makes a life go well. Happiness has 
recently been claimed to be a special good of childhood, in that children are alleged to 
be especially good at accessing happiness, and we do of course like to think of children 
as care-free and happy little souls, untroubled by life’s pressures and constraints. Of 
course, it is undeniable that children are often deliriously happy. According to Anca 
Gheaus, children 
have a remarkable ability to enjoy life. They can take more pleasure than adults 
in their sensations, ideas, bodies, people and places; they are more capable than 
adults of wholehearted fun and laughter. Also, most children seem less 
susceptible to some kinds of misery: They rarely, if ever, feel tired with life.25 
Gheaus cites the psychologist Alison Gopnik as saying that to perceive the world like a 
baby is like ‘being in love in Paris for the first time after you’ve ever had three double 
espressos.’26 But as anyone who has been young and in love and in Paris, or has been 
around a deliriously happy child, knows: both are likely to end in tears. The point is, 
while children are often happy little souls, they also spend a lot of their time deeply 
upset – much more time, I think, than most adults do. When was the last time you 
found yourself uncontrollably sobbing? For most adults, this is a relatively rare 
occurrence. For young children, it is part of everyday life. So, while children may be 
excellent at accessing happy moments, the flip side of that is that they are often upset. 
You may be tempted to discount the fact that children cry so much. You might be 
tempted to do so on one (or both) of two bases. The first is that children may simply 
cry more easily than adults – the link between their being upset and crying is on more 
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of a hair trigger than for adults. So, their crying is not evidence of their being more 
upset, just evidence of them outwardly showing their emotions more readily.27 But if 
that is the case, why think children especially happy? – perhaps the same is true for 
those moments of unbridled joy we all love to witness in our kids, perhaps they just 
seem especially happy. Anca Gheaus claims that we adults have been socialized into 
displaying our happy moments but not our despair.28 There is probably some truth to 
this, and I am straying outside the philosopher’s comfort zone here, but I don’t think it 
captures the whole difference between children and adults – children are, I think, 
simply more emotionally volatile. They seem genuinely deeply upset by many things 
in ways that I think most adults (whose lives are not scarred by depression) are not. 
The second reason we might discount children being so upset is that the things they 
get upset about often don’t really matter. The blog ‘Reasons my son is crying’ offers 
excellent examples of this.29 It features pictures of children in floods of tears with 
explanations as to what has made them so upset. Here are some examples: 
- "I told him he could not take his unwrapped tampon out to run errands." 
- "We told him that his dinosaur is blue." (His dinosaur is blue). 
- "He cried because his Nutella waffle was folded in half. Then he ate it and cried 
again because it was gone.” 
- “I let him play on the grass” 
- "The postman didn’t have any mail for us today." 
- "I told her she couldn’t stab her twin sister with a pair of scissors." 
- "The polka-dot shirt she asked to wear has polka-dots on it." 
- "Jim Morrison was a boy (and not a girl like she thought)." 
We may be tempted to think this is a good feature of children’s lives. We put ourselves 
in their shoes and think ‘imagine the most upsetting thing in my life was that I 
discovered that Jim Morrison was a boy – wow, things would be going pretty well for 
me!’ But the fact that children get (or at least seem) deeply upset about things that 
don’t really matter is not necessarily a reason to doubt that their being (or at least 
seeming) deeply upset is not evidence of their lives not going well. Rather, it seems to 
be a further way in which their lives are not going well: 
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3. Children care deeply about things that really don’t matter. Remember, we are 
imagining here that what makes a child’s life go well is the same as what makes an 
adult’s life go well. Imagine an adult uncontrollably crying over any of these things, or 
about whether her cutlery was orange or red. You’d think them unbalanced, and that, 
in a certain respect, their life was not going well. So, not only do I think that, judged by 
adult standards, children’s lives are going less well on account of how much they cry 
and are upset, what makes them upset also makes me think that their lives are going 
less well. 
 
VII 
Let us now turn to the second of the four views outlined above, the view that says that 
children and adults lives go well in different ways – what makes a child’s life go well is 
not co-extensive with what makes an adult’s life go well. I am inclined toward this 
view. This is in part because I place a very high value on personal freedom and non-
domination in thinking about what makes an adult life go well. These kinds of values 
matter so much, I think, because of certain capacities that adults have. Paternalism, 
whilst sometimes justifiable toward adults, is always pro tanto bad for those who have 
certain kinds of capacities. It is not bad for children, who lack these capacities, or do 
not possess them to the same degree. We may hope to give children some degree of 
personal freedom, but not all interference is bad when it comes to children. Further, it 
just seems implausible to impose the same standards in measuring how well my life is 
going and how well a two year old’s life is going – we are such different creatures. And 
finally the leading theories of adult wellbeing seem to do a poor job of capturing our 
intuitions when applied to children.30 
My aim here is not to argue for this view. Rather, in this section, I want to argue that if 
we take this view, then we shouldn’t think that being turned from a child into an adult 
makes an individual’s life go better or worse, rather it involves turning them from one 
kind of thing into another. I will label this view the Caterpillar View, since caterpillars 
become butterflies which (I will stipulate) are fundamentally different kinds of things, 
with different lives and different goods. Unlike the Sapling View, on which childhood 
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is an inferior version of adulthood, the Caterpillar View says that children and adults 
are just different kinds of things. The Caterpillar View leads us to a rather strange 
conclusion: neither Erin nor Dane are (necessarily) harmed, since being turned from 
one thing into another is not the sort of thing that can benefit or harm a person. 
To argue this is to deny John Stuart Mill’s famous claim that ‘It is better to be a human 
being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied.’31 To challenge Mill’s claim, first consider Roger 
Crisp’s version of the human/pig comparison, in his ‘Haydn and the Oyster’ example: 
Imagine you are a soul in heaven, waiting for a life on Earth. By the time your 
turn comes around, the angel only has two lives left – the life of the composer 
Joseph Haydn and that of an oyster. Besides composing some wonderful music 
and influencing the evolution of the symphony, Haydn will meet with success 
and honour in his own lifetime, be cheerful and popular, travel and gain much 
enjoyment from field sports. The oyster’s life is far less exciting. Though this is 
a rather sophisticated oyster, its life will only consist of mild sensual pleasure, 
rather like that experienced by humans floating very drunk in a warm bath.32 
Notice that Crisp makes explicit what Mill leaves implicit – that in order for 
experience a (being Haydn/human) to be better than experience b (being an oyster, or 
a pig) for some being there has to be some being which is theoretically capable of 
experiencing a and b (e.g., some being who could be a human or an oyster). In Crisp’s 
example, it is a soul. You may think that the ‘soul in heaven’ element of this example is 
superfluous, it just makes the comparison between an oyster’s life and Haydn’s 
especially vivid. But I think it is absolutely central to the example, and stripped of the 
religious background, the example (and the comparison) makes no sense. Is it better 
for me to remain a person or become an oyster? That question doesn’t make sense 
unless we assume the following: that the oyster will also be me. This is because of the 
following principle: 
The Survival Condition: In order to judge whether some ‘new life’ will be a 
better for me, I must be able to live the new life: I must be able to survive the 
change. If I cannot, bringing about the ‘new life’ is bringing about the 
equivalent of my death.33 
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If, like me, you don’t believe in souls, then it is questionable whether there is any such 
thing that could be a human being (let alone Haydn specifically) or an oyster. There 
are people and there are oysters. Being a human being or an oyster is so central to 
identity that identity cannot survive the change from person to oyster (or person to 
frog, for any fairy-tale witches considering that punishment). Indeed, even staying 
within the same kind of being, I don’t think identity can survive some changes. For 
example, it doesn’t seem to make sense to think that it would be better for me if I 
were, say, David Beckham. Beckham’s life may be better than mine, but in order for it 
to be better for me to be him, it must be possible for me to become him and still be 
me. 
What relevance does this have for our discussion of changing from childhood to 
adulthood? Well, you might believe that identity can’t survive the change from 
childhood to adulthood – being a child and being an adult are such fundamentally 
different things that it doesn’t make sense to say that I am the same being who had 
the childhood I tend to think of as ‘mine’. However, neither psychological nor physical 
approaches to identity seem to support such a conclusion. I was a child. The butterfly 
was a caterpillar.34 
So, I want to argue for an additional principle: 
The Type of Being Condition: In order for some change to be better or worse for 
me then the change must not render me such that a fundamentally different 
account of wellbeing applies to me. And in order for possible future a to be 
better for me than possible future b, the same account of wellbeing must apply 
to the being that I will be in a and the being that I will be in b. 
The claim here is that even when identity survives some change, if that change renders 
one an altogether different kind of being, with a different account of wellbeing 
attached to it, then it isn’t better for you to become that new kind of being, you have 
simply become another kind of being. (Or, if you are choosing between future a and 
future b, future b can only be better for you than future a if you’ll be the same kind of 
being in future a and future b.) 
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I keep talking of a ‘kind of being’. What do I mean by this? For our purposes, beings 
are of the same kind when the same (fundamental) account of wellbeing applies to 
them. They differ when different (fundamental) accounts of wellbeing apply to them.35 
You might believe that we should measure all beings’ wellbeing in the same way – for 
example, by measuring their happiness according to some physical measure (e.g., 
measures of serotonin). In that case, all beings are the same kinds of being. The issue 
of whether you’d be better off being an oyster would make sense (as long as identity 
would also survive), and would come down to whether oysters or people do better on 
the physical measure. The position this section explores (that what makes children’s 
and adults’ lives go well differs, at the fundamental level) explicitly denies that all 
beings share the same account of wellbeing. It claims that children and adults are  
different kinds of being (in the relevant sense).36 
My claim here is that if children and adults are different kinds of being, since they 
have fundamentally different accounts of wellbeing, then there is no more ultimate 
account of wellbeing to which we could appeal in assessing whether children or adults 
have better lives. This is why I believe that once we accept that there are childhood-
specific goods, we are required to say that neither Dane nor Erin are harmed (or 
benefitted) by the pills they are given. That is, we are not harmed, or benefitted, just 
by being made to continue to be, or turned into, a certain kind of being (unless it were 
against our wishes, and preference-satisfaction were a kind of wellbeing for that kind 
of being), since our wellbeing is to be settled by reference to an account of wellbeing 
tailored to the kind of thing we are. 
It is important to note that I do not posit here the claim that children and adults are 
different kinds of being and therefore differing accounts of wellbeing apply. Rather, 
they are different kinds of being (if indeed they are) because differing accounts of 
wellbeing apply. Clearly to make good on this account, a further argument is needed 
that would show when the same, and when different, accounts of wellbeing apply. I 
will not try to supply that here. I simply premise my arguments on the (increasingly 
popular) claim that there are specific childhood goods, such that the accounts of 
wellbeing differ for adults and children. I wanted to make this point especially clear 
because several people have pointed to some potential implications of the account37: 
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in particular, it may be taken to suggest that certain kinds of deterioration as a result 
of ageing and disease are not bad for the adults that experience them, since they will 
become different kinds of being, and thus the transition cannot be bad for them. Does 
this mean that we are foolish to combat these kinds of deterioration? The first thing to 
note is that certain extreme kinds of deterioration can, in my view, mean that the 
adult does not survive, and so the change is bad for the adult in that she ceases to 
exist. The second thing to note is that we may have reasons other than it being bad for 
the person to combat such deterioration. Finally, and most importantly, this 
implication does not strictly follow from my claim here. There may be a way of 
dividing up accounts of wellbeing (and thus types of being) in which children and 
adults differ, but healthy and aged/deteriorated adults are the same. I have not taken a 
stand on how to differentiate which account applies to who, though it seems a 
significant possibility that any proposal may lead to us separating out adults and 
aged/deteriorated adults. If that follows, we can either abandon the account, or accept 
the seemingly counter-intuitive implication. 
Could it be that even if our accounts of wellbeing for two different entities differs we 
are still able to say that being one kind of being is better for me than being another? 
Some have certainly suggested as much to me.38 But in order for this to be the case, 
there would have to be something other than wellbeing on the basis of which we can 
determine whether x or y is better for me. Perhaps this is terminological, but I take the 
question of wellbeing to be, precisely, the question of what is better and worse for 
someone/thing. Therefore there is no conceptual space for being turned from one 
being from another to be beneficial or harmful to someone/thing. However, even if we 
allow that wellbeing is not all there is to how well our lives are going, if it is a (non-
hierarchical) element of the answer to that question, we will face the same problems. 
Imagine that how well our lives go is determined by both our wellbeing and our moral 
status. You change me from a being with one account of wellbeing to another, and 
with an increased moral status. All else equal my higher moral status makes me better 
off. But we have no way of knowing whether all else is equal, since the accounts of 
wellbeing are different, and there is no metric on which we can compare them. 
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Now imagine that moral status is a dominant element of how well our lives are going 
in a hierarchical account: it is always better (all-things-considered) to be a being of 
higher moral status, with differing accounts of ‘wellbeing’ operating below that level. 
This would rather alter our understanding of the situation – my discussion here has 
been premised on the idea that our ultimate account of internal value differs between 
beings, but here, the most important determinant of internal value would share a 
metric (moral status) across beings. Some of our conclusions, however, could still 
stand: we would no longer be able to say that being moved from one kind of being to 
another is neither good or bad for you, but we could still say that wellbeing between 
beings is non-comparable, and (provided harm is conceptually related to wellbeing 
rather than moral status) that you are not harmed when you are moved to a new type 
of being, or kept as one kind of being rather than being moved to another. 
 
VIII 
Does this mean that, contrary to what we normally think, parents could refuse to raise 
their children, and keep them as children? They wouldn’t, after all, be harming them 
by making them remain children. 
I still think this would be wrong. It could be wrong on many grounds not focused on 
the wellbeing of the individual, but I think it would still be wrong even on the basis of 
the individual’s wellbeing. Here my tentative suggestion for squaring this circle: by 
stunting development, you would be giving the child a bad childhood. My claim that 
you harm someone by making them remain a child is not based on the idea that 
childhood is inferior to adulthood, or that becoming an adult makes one better off. 
Rather, it is based on this claim: A good childhood naturally leads to adulthood. To be 
clear, this isn’t to say that childhoods which are tragically cut short were bad 
childhoods. Rather, good childhoods demand progress, and that will (all being well) 
eventually lead to adulthood. This is Schapiro’s view. There is an internal pressure 
from inside a (well-lived) childhood that pushes us toward adulthood. Given this, we 
better get our children ready for adulthood, and help them along the path toward it. 
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We can underpin this claim by positing a childhood good of development – getting 
better at things. We needn’t say that being good at things is itself what makes 
childhood go well, but just that getting better at them, working at them, is part of what 
makes a childhood go well. Consider those pills we’re giving Erin – they keep her just 
as she is. My claim is that even if adulthood isn’t better than childhood, this is a bad 
childhood. Either Erin doesn’t learn and develop or she learns and develops but is 
forced backward each time she takes a pill. 
 
IX 
In conclusion, in this paper I have explored some tricky issues about ways in which we 
might compare the goods of childhood and adulthood. I have tried to argue for the 
following claims: 
First, there are several (potentially) distinct comparisons that we can (try to) make 
between childhood and adulthood. We must keep them distinct and try to be clear 
about which we are addressing. Second, it may be harder than we think to think about 
what makes children’s lives go well – that we used to be children makes us more 
confident than we should be that we can imagine what it is like to be a child. Third, 
there are, in essence two views about the internal value of childhood and adulthood – 
that adult and child wellbeing has a single (ultimate) account, or that there are 
different adult- and child-specific accounts. Fourth, if the former, it seems likely to me 
that children’s lives go worse (in general) than adult lives (the Sapling View), in 
particular because of the way that children are dominated. Fifth, if (as seems plausible 
to me) the latter, then we cannot compare children’s and adults’ lives – it cannot be 
better or worse to be an adult or a child, as what is better or worse for you depends on 
whether you are an adult or a child (the Caterpillar View).39 
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